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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to investigate empirically the political talk show phenomenon
in Taiwan. Specifically, the study examined the perceived influence of political talk shows on the
Taiwanese audience themselves (first-person effect) and others (third-person effect), the
attitudinal antecedents of the perceived influences, and attitude toward restrictions on political
talk shows. Data were collected from a convenient sample of 1053 adult Taiwanese citizens via
an online survey. The results supported the hypothesized relationships between attitude toward
political talk shows and perceived influence of the shows on self and others. Results also
supported the looking glass perception hypothesis whereby the perceived influence of political
talk shows on oneself was projected onto that of others. The perceived influences on self and
others were unrelated to attitude toward restrictions, however.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Open and unfiltered political communications are the cornerstone of a democratic political
system. In Taiwan, the political communications landscape has gone through some dramatic
changes. As a result, the Taiwanese people can now choose from a multitude of political news
outlets and platforms, and enjoy a genuinely pluralistic political media environment. As a young
democracy, however, Taiwan has also been facing new and difficult challenges, including its
extremely polarized political environment, the rising power of political and commercial interests,
as well as the presence of highly perceptible media bias. In Taiwan, as Rawnsley and Gong
(2011) put it, “News organizations now routinely resort to sensationalism to attract bigger
audiences and advertising revenues, leading to concerns about finding ways to regulate lurid and
invasive reporting” (p. 324).
One of the most conspicuous developments in Taiwan’s political communications landscape
is the emergence of television political talk shows. Modeled after American political talk shows
like Face the Nation, Meet the Press and backed by mainstream Taiwanese news organizations,
these political talk shows provide information on news events, help viewers digest information
and entertain viewers through vivid discussion and debate. Unlike traditional news, however, the
information presented in the talk shows is often slanted by the ideologies of program hosts and
guests who seldom shy away from expressing their views and positions in the most biased,
cynical and inflammatory language. Despite severe criticism from media scholars and research
organizations (e.g., Taiwan Media Watch, 2002; Jiang, 2001; Yang, 2004; Chang & Lo, 2007;
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Tang, 2014), political talk shows have been increasingly gaining popularity among Taiwanese
viewers.
The purpose of this study is to investigate empirically the political talk show phenomenon
in Taiwan. Specifically, the study examined the perceived influence of political talk shows on
Taiwanese public opinion, the attitudinal antecedents of the perceived influence, and public
views toward corrective actions or policies. The first- and third-person effects hypotheses were
the main theoretical framework from which specific research hypotheses are derived. The
following sections of the article will present in greater detail the background of the study, a
review of relevant literature, the hypothesized relationships among the variables, an outline of
the research methodology, and the results of the study.

The Background
To better understand the popularity of and controversy over political talk shows in Taiwan,
we must understand the changing Taiwanese political and media environment.

The Political Environment in Taiwan
Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), is a democratic country in East Asia. With
an area of 36,118 square kilometers and a population of 23.5 million (2015), the country is
separated from the Chinese mainland by the Taiwan Strait and shares maritime borders with
China, Japan, and the Philippines.
After the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), the Chinese communist People's Republic of
China (PRC), led by Mao Zedong, took control of Mainland China, while Kuomintang (KMT),
the Chinese Nationalist Party, led by Chiang Kai-shek, moved the ROC government from
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Mainland China to Taiwan. Since then both governments have contended to be the sole
legitimate government of China. The “cross-strait relations” and the question of eventual
unification have become the dominant issues between the two governments.
Over the next few decades, Taiwan has prospered to become one of the “Four Asian Tigers.”
Often referred to as the Taiwan Economic Miracle, the country’s GDP grew by 360% between
1965 and 1986. Politically, however, Taiwan remained under the authoritarian rule of the KMT
party until reforms in the late 1970s through the 1990s. It was not until 1987 that the order of
martial law was finally lifted by the government. In 1991 the national assembly held its first
election, followed by the first direct legislative election in 1992. In 1996, Lee Ten-hui, leader of
the KMT party, won the first direct presidential election in Taiwanese history. In 2000, Chen
Shui-Bien, the candidate of the opposing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the
presidency and ended the KMT’s more than fifty years of continuous rule in Taiwan.
Today, Taiwan is one of the only three liberal democracies in East Asia (along with Japan
and South Korea). As Larry Diamond (2001, p. 1), a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution,
writes: “By any measure, Taiwan is a democracy today. It has regular, free, and fair elections to
determine who will exercise government power. These elections are meaningful, in that victory
at the polls confers real power on the winning party. Increasingly, electoral competition is
vigorous and uncertain, as witnessed by the historic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) victory
in the 2000 presidential election. The Kuomintang’s monopoly on the political system has been
shattered and will never be restored.”
However, Diamond (2001) also points out that, despite its democratic progress, Taiwan
faces an uncertain future due to five internal problems: (1) the widespread corruption in politics
and government, (2) the institutional weakness of the rule of law, especially the judiciary, (3)
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polarized party politics along the lines of ethnicity (Mainlander vs. Taiwanese), (4) serious
deficiencies in the constitutional system and the lack of consensus in the executive structure and
the electoral system, and (5) the lack of consolidated democratic values at the level of mass
public opinion – and the need for the government, political institutions and politicians to exhibit
greater accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and accommodation.
It should be noted that the problems Diamond (2001) identified are inevitably entangled
with Taiwan’s political relations with Mainland China. Supporters of the KMT (known as the
Pan-Blue coalition) agree that Taiwan is a sovereign country; they also favor the one-China
principle that insists both Taiwan and Mainland China are inalienable parts of a single China. In
contrast, the DPP and its supporters (known as the Pan-Green coalition) reject the one-China
principle as the basis for cross-strait relations and argue that, under the ROC Constitution,
Taiwan has already achieved de facto independence from Mainland China. The highly divisive
disputes between the coalitions had become more intense and frequent since Tsai Yin-wen, the
DPP leader, won the presidential election in 2016.
For more information about the political environment in Taiwan, please refer to Appendix A:
Taiwan Profile.

The Media Environment in Taiwan
Taiwan’s media, once tightly controlled by the government, is now considered one of the
freest in the world. Article 11 of the ROC Constitution states that “The people shall have
freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and publication.” The lifting of martial law and three
peaceful transfers of political power between rival parties further solidified the freedom of
speech and freedom of the press on the island. In its 2017 Freedom of the Press report, the
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U.S-based Freedom House gives Taiwan the highest ratings on freedom of expression and belief
as well as political rights and civil liberties in Asia. Likewise, the French-based Reporters
without Borders rates Taiwan as having Asia’s freest media in 2017 with a press freedom
ranking of 45 out of 180 countries, which is slightly behind the United States at 43, Japan at 72
and China at 176.
Today, there are hundreds of privately-owned cable TV channels, radio stations,
newspapers and magazines in Taiwan, reflecting a wide range of editorial content and policies.
Taiwan is also one of the most wired countries in the world, with close to 80% of Taiwanese
accessing the Internet daily and about 82% of Taiwanese having a Facebook account
(Rickardson, 2016).
Despite progress in securing freedom of the press in Taiwan, the media have also been
criticized for playing a controversial and negative role in Taiwan’s democratic process. The main
criticism is that many news outlets lean heavily toward either the pro-China KMT or the
pro-independence DPP, resulting in not only politically biased reporting but also a more
polarized picture of Taiwanese society than it actually is. Due to rapid change and development,
the media in Taiwan have been in an acrimonious competition environment. Intense competition
for profits led to another frequent criticism of Taiwanese media for placing too much stress on
cheap, entertainment-oriented and even sensationalist news reports (Rawnsley & Rawnsley,
2012).
In his meticulous review of the changing roles of media in Taiwan, Huang (2009) concludes
that the fierce competition in the market and excessive commercialism have severely damaged
the professionalism and credibility of the media. “In Taiwan, the media have long been labeled
as the ‘rumor, gossip, abuse and slaughter industry.’ They are labeled as ‘mad dogs’ in a

	
  

5	
  

democratic society” (Huang, 2009, p. 15). Negative public perceptions of the media have
increased to the point that many people attribute Taiwan’s current disorderly politics almost
entirely to the media. “Taiwan’s media became unprincipled and untrustworthy because of its
involvement in political struggles and the fierce in place. The public interest became the main
loser” (Huang, 2009, p. 20). The lofty view of media as the fourth estate or a guardian of
democracy faces criticism as media are frequently under pressure to achieve commercial profits,
increase their market share of audiences, and maintain ideological predispositions. Indeed, the
media have been criticized as being lapdogs for certain socio-economic groups and political
parties and as active propagators of specific societal thinking and political agendas.

Television Political Talk Shows in Taiwan
Much of the current criticism of the quality of Taiwan’s journalism focuses on the
numerous TV stations, including Taiwan’s seven 24-hour cable news operations. In a
hyper-competitive environment, most seem to be investing less and less in programming, despite
their attractiveness to advertisers due to TV’s high penetration rate at 99.37%. To save money,
the stations tend to frequently air content such as political talk shows, which are inexpensive to
produce. The first political talk show in Taiwan started in 1992, and political talk show programs
became popular around 2000. To this day, there are 10 to 12 television political talk shows and
call-in programs every night, running one after another.
In many ways the rapid development and growing popularity of political talk shows follows
the “the narrative imperative” by which audiences expect media sources “not only to inform but
also to explain, interpret, persuade and entertain” and to tell stories that hang together and have a
point of view, rather than simply providing unadulterated information (Mullainathan & Shleifer,
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2005, p. 1031). Unlike regular television news programs, political talk shows usually reserve a
designated time slot for hosts and commentators (called “minzui” or famous mouth in Taiwan)
who address specific issues in a specific length of time. Some talk shows even solicit the
audience’s participation to generate viewers’ interests and to give viewers a feeling of
engagement. Through these interactions, hosts and commentators play multiple roles: first,
“educating” the public about the details, intrigues, and nuisances of a topic; second, “engaging”
in discussion among themselves and call-in viewers to arouse public attention; and, last,
“entertaining” viewers with witty quips to soften the hard and dry facts (Lee, 2011).
To some extent, Taiwanese political talk shows reflect what recent deliberative democracy
proponents have envisioned as informed and reasoned judgments of the citizenry (Bessette, 1980,
1994). Deliberative democracy stresses the explicit and implicit reconstruction of political
deliberation beyond the normative formal decision-making process. It broadens the venues of
opportunity and accessibility for political participation to constituents beyond the relatively few
designated representatives, enabling them to engage in self-reflection and critical analysis of
political issues in a reciprocal manner (Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). Public engagement in
deliberation takes time and is likely to foster debates and controversies, but citizen participation
provides an opportunity to converse, to learn more about policy issues, and to hold political
leaders accountable (Fishkin, 1995).
Regrettably, the ideal version of deliberative democracy was never fully materialized in
Taiwan, given the commercial pressures and the stakeholders that are deeply divided by almost
irreconcilable differences. Despite the fact that some talk show hosts might prefer civility,
objectivity, and fairness in issue choice and discussion, they have to market their programs in
order to win viewers’ loyalty. The necessity to sustain a faithful audience by demonstrating
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uniqueness in style and substance also becomes a force to push programs away from the center
and toward one side of the political spectrum. Initially, the programs invited guests with different
or opposing points of views. However, since 2006, most of the shows would feature the majority
of guests from either Pan-Blue or Pan-Green coalitions with clear political positions. Similar to
some American news talk show hosts, some Taiwanese show hosts would occasionally attack or
accuse political parties and politicians who hold opposing political beliefs or attitudes (e.g.,
Hofstetter & Gianos, 1997; Hall & Cappella, 2002).
To make the matter worse, different television stations in Taiwan have their own political
predispositions and it is not uncommon for them to frame or favor certain political issues
differently (Chang & Lo, 2007). Each talk show’s visible political favoritism and ideological tilt
attracts a huge amount of commercial advertising to the station from likeminded corporations
and political parties. For example, the DPP government had long funneled substantial budgetary
resources into the pan-Green SET (Sanlih Entertainment TV) and FTV (Formosa TV).
Through framing, talk show hosts, with the tacit support of carefully chosen guest
commentators as collaborators, determine what angle and what content to include in political
deliberation as well as what to subtly exclude. Similar to a tactic used in talk shows in other
countries, talk show framing in Taiwan uses a mix of information and entertainment to elicit
viewers’ attention to certain readings and aspects of political happenings. Both hosts and
commentators may prepare a brief summary of topic essentials, provide a flowchart to show
sequential developments, employ idioms and folk slang for mockeries, and show colorfully
printed posters or dry erase boards for easy understanding and dialogue stimulation. Sometimes,
inflammatory titles or subtitles regarding the content of the program serve to evoke debatable
and imagined implications. The connotations and implications of headings and subtitles
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implicitly highlight different perspectives of the issue at hand, guide viewers on how to approach
the issue, and lead viewers to reconsider their interests, sentiments, and political values.
Talk-show programs tend to keep several regular commentators on their guest lists, mostly
former print journalists who are witty in quick responses, resourceful in filling in details of daily
events, and eloquent in their showmanship and argumentation. Their journalistic training and
experiences equip them well to address sudden events. They are articulate and forceful in style
and language, employing occasional vulgar expressions. Sometimes, some veteran minzuis even
stage fights and deliberately exchange diatribes to demonstrate their pluralist perspectives and
thus imply their “independent and objective” postures in order to gain viewers’ trust and to boost
ratings.
Needless to say, politicians welcome the opportunity to appear on talk shows. In a
symbiotic relationship, politicians court producers and hosts for communication space to boost
their name recognition, while media professionals cultivate politicians for exclusive coverage
and access to first-hand information. Talk shows run during all seasons, thus allowing politicians
to bring forward and spin certain political agendas to test the water, to maintain visibility, or to
confront opponents rhetorically and publically to demonstrate policy distinction, among other
functions.
Instead of reaching a consensual understanding through rigorous debate and dialogue across
the political divide in a democratic society, political talk shows in Taiwan frequently reinforce
the level of nondeliberative disagreements (Guttmann & Thompson, 2004) wherein the policy
stance of one’s opponents is so anathema to one’s morals that no compromise is acceptable.
Numerous scholars, professionals, and organizations have openly criticized the programs and
called for self-regulation that balance media rights and responsibilities. The creation of the
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National Communications Commission in 2006, the authority responsible for regulating
telecommunications and broadcasting services, seems to suggest that Taiwan finally recognizes
that free media does not mean unregulated media and that a regulated system is not necessarily
an undemocratic system (Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2012).
Numerous questions could be raised regarding the political talks shows phenomenon in
Taiwan. In this study, we focus on the questions most directly related to the Taiwanese people,
i.e., the audiences of the programs. Specifically, this study attempted to address the following
questions: What are Taiwanese viewers’ attitudes toward political talk shows in specific and
what are the viewers’ attitudes on politics in general? To what extent do Taiwanese viewers find
themselves and others susceptible to the influence of political shows? To what extent do the
viewers’ attitudes toward political talk shows and politics affect their perceived influence of
political talk shows? And to what extent does the perceived influence of political talk shows
affect their views about restrictions on such shows?
In what follows, we will present a review of the theoretical constructs and relevant literature.
A distinction between the first- and the third-person effect is made to facilitate understanding of
the perceived influence of political talk shows. Also made is the distinction between attitude
toward political talk shows and attitude toward politics, both conceptualized as antecedents of
the perceived first- and third-person effect. A structural equation model, which incorporates all
hypothesized relationships among the key constructs, will then be presented, followed by a the
hypotheses testing results.
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Chapter Two
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a review of the literature pertaining to the key theoretical
constructs: First-person effect, third-person effect, attitude toward political talk shows, attitude
toward politics, and attitude toward talk show restrictions.

First-Person and Third-Person Effect
Studies in mass communication and public opinion point to the need to distinguish between
the perceived influence of media on oneself (first-person effect) and the perceived influence on
others (third-person effect). The same distinction is made in the present study between viewers’
perceived influence of political talk shows on themselves and on others.
The third-person effect perceptual hypothesis, first proposed by Davison (1983), predicts
that individuals will perceive media messages to have a greater impact on other people than on
themselves. The hypothesis has generated numerous studies in an effort to explain this
phenomenon. Some researchers have argued that the third-person effect, at its heart, reflects a
self-serving bias (Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Gunther & Thorson, 1992). In their meta-analysis,
Paul, Salwen, and Dupagne (2000) discussed varying sociological and psychological theories
that have been used to explain the third-person effect and its consequences, including ego
involvement, the elaboration likelihood model, the social categorization theory, attribution
theory, and biased optimism.
The comparison between self and others constitutes a form of unrealistic and biased
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optimism that is motivated by the need for ego enhancement (Brown, 1986). The same
motivation also may lead people to think that others are more likely to be harmed by the media;
if by comparison, it enhances their view of themselves (McLeod et al., 1999). Consequently, the
more negative a message is perceived, the wider the gap between its perceived influence on self
and others (Eveland & McLeod, 1999).
Perloff (1996) notes that the third-person effect is likely to manifest itself when media
message advocates behavior that will not be beneficial for the self or gives rise to the perception
that it is not smart to be influenced by the message. The end result is that people surmise others
to fall victim to media’s influence while they do not. White (1997) also suggests that people are
likely to consider themselves smarter and more resistant to a message when they feel the topic is
one that has little benefit, or even potentially harmful consequences, for its audience. Similarly,
Eveland et al. (1999) argue that the magnitude of the third-person effect perception is influenced
by the social desirability of the message—the lower the social desirability of the message, the
stronger the third-person effect.
Many researchers see the behavioral aspect of the third-person effect as the most socially
relevant phenomenon. The behavioral aspect suggests that people will favor restricting messages
that may negatively affect others. McLeod et al. (2001) showed that support for censorship
stemmed from subjects’ experiencing third-person perception. Salwen and Dupagne (1999)
found that willingness to support censorship was attributable to the perception that others were
not wholesome enough to resist immoral influences. In some instances, the support for limiting
access to media found its justification from a paternalistic attitude and the need to protect others
from harmful media effects (McLeod, 1999).
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In a recent study, Wu (2009) presented empirical evidence supporting the presence of the
perceived third-person effect of political talk shows in Taiwan. Through a large-scale survey
among Taiwanese adults (n=1980), the study found that respondents generally believed that
political talk shows had greater negative effects on others than on themselves. Negative effects
were measured by the lack of trust in politics, the sense of political powerlessness and the
disappointment in the political environment. Respondents also felt that the greater the perceived
negative influence of political talk shows on others, the more likely they would be in favor of
imposing restrictions on such programs. The study further supported the hypotheses that the
perceived third-person effect is positively correlated with the amount of attention paid to politics
and negatively correlated with the perceived benefit of political talk shows in the society.
In contrast to the third-person effect, the first-person effect has been found to occur when
the potential benefit from a message is high. That is, when media messages are positive and
advocate beneficial outcomes, people tend to consider themselves just as influenced as others;
and in some cases, they may anticipate on an even stronger effect on themselves. As Golan and
Day (2008) indicate, “first-person effect has also been identified when individuals tend to
perceive a stronger effect for self than others from mediated messages deemed socially
acceptable to be persuaded by” (pp. 541-542). Gunther and Mundy (1993) point out that as
interest in the messages increases so does the perceived influence on ourselves. Eveland and
McLeod (1999) argue that ego enhancement is responsible for the observed first-person effect
where people view themselves as more persuaded by the desirable media content.
Gunther and Thorson (1992) made the distinction between messages that are intended to
inform, such as news, and those that are intended to persuade, such as advertising. They argued
that people will perceive the two domains of messages accordingly and will show
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domain-specific processing patterns. Specifically, exposure to news is both sought-after and
socially desirable, while advertising is usually an event to avoid. Being persuaded by advertising
is often viewed as detrimental, the general sphere of advertising would thus be likely to exhibit
the third-person effect.
However, Gunther and Thorson (1992) also noted that some advertising might induce the
first-person effect. They examined estimates of influence on self and others in relation to ads that
contained an emotional appeal and found that although the self and others were equally affected
by the positively-emotional message, subjects tended to recognize and admit more of an impact
on themselves than others. Given that advertising messages are typically fun, warm, exciting,
and thus emotional, one would expect such advertising to induce the first-person effect as well.
It should also be noted that the first- and the third-person effect are often related.
Specifically, the perceived influence of media content on self may constitute the basis for the
assessment of the influence on others. The reasoning is consistent with the hypothesis of
looking-glass perception which finds individuals to project their own thoughts and feelings onto
others: “what I think must be what others think” (Fields & Schuman, 1976; Chan & Lee, 2009;
Ross, Greene & House, 1977). The looking glass perception is assumed to operate quite apart
from the actual distribution of opinion. Relative to the current study, the hypothesis suggests that
if Taiwanese people experience the first-person effect of political talk shows, they would project
the perceived influence onto others in the form of the third-person effect.

Attitude toward Political Talk Shows and Politics
Even though there is a rich literature investigating the first and third-person effects and their
behavioral consequences, a deeper understanding of the effects warrant further analysis on how
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these effects come about. Within the context of political talk shows, we argue that attitude
toward politics in general and attitude toward political talk shows in specific are two important
and related antecedents of perceived first- and third-person effects.
The argument is based on the notion that exposure to political talk shows is essentially a
political behavior. Two predictors of such behavior are experiential and instrumental attitudes
toward the behavior. Experiential attitudes concern the degree to which an individual perceives a
behavior to be interesting, whereas instrumental attitudes reflect the degree to which the behavior
is deemed important (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).
For those individuals who find politics uninteresting and unimportant, exposure to political
talk shows will be deemed worthless. These individuals will retain low levels of exposure given
the perceived lack of utility from this activity and consequently perceive little if any influence of
exposure on themselves or others. In contrast, for those who find politics interesting and
important, exposure to political talk shows is not only a form of political participation (McLeod,
Shah, Hess, & Lee, 2010) but also a eudaimonic (meaningfully enjoyable) activity (Holbert,
Zeng, & Robinson, 2017). For these individuals, the high interest and importance attached to
exposure to political talk shows are likely to amplify their perceived influence of exposure on
themselves and others.
The reasoning above also points to the intricate relationship between attitude toward politics
in general and attitude toward political talk shows in particular. If politics can be defined as “the
activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between
parties having power” (Oxford) at the macro level, then political talk shows might be viewed as
an outward micro-manifestation of politics at work. The experiential and instrumental attitudes
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toward both politics and political talk shows should, therefore, be expected to function in the
same direction.
Additional insight into these two attitudes may be obtained from research in related fields.
In advertising research, for example, a distinction is made between attitude toward advertising in
general and attitude toward specific advertising messages. The general research finding is that, at
the micro level, ads that are well-liked are more likely to be attended, remembered, and
persuasive. A well-liked ad creates a well-liked product (Phelps & Hoy, 1996). Petty &
Cacioppo’s (1983) study of advertising effects revealed that attitudes toward an advertised
product were influenced more by their attitude toward the ad, or ad likeability, than thoughts
about the actual product. Similar findings were obtained in several other studies (e.g., Bergkvist
& Rossiter 2008; Yelkur, Tomkovick, Hofer, & Rozumalski, 2013; Shavitt, Lowrey, & Hasefner,
1998; Shen, 1998).
At the macro level, public attitudes toward advertising in general also have been of interest
to researchers for years. Advertising researchers have been interested in the impact of overall
attitudes toward advertising on consumer behavior variables. Studies have suggested, for
example, that consumers' attitudes toward individual advertisements are influenced by their
attitudes toward advertising in general. People with more favorable feelings about advertising, in
general, found specific advertisements more acceptable, informative, and enjoyable (Bartos &
Dunn, 1974; Bauer & Greyser, 1968; Lutz, 1985). Consumers' overall positive attitude toward all
advertising is also related positively to involvement with specific advertisements (James &
Kover, 1992). From a public policy perspective, concerns have been voiced that criticisms of
advertising (i.e., it presents false and misleading information, it promotes undesirable values, it
persuades people to buy things they do not need, etc.) may undermine its effectiveness or even
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lead to pleas for greater regulation (Calfee & Ringold, 1988; Pollay & Mittal, 1993).
A recent study by Liu, Dong & Tang (2017) conceptualized (macro) attitude toward alcohol
products and (micro) attitude toward alcohol advertising as antecedents of the perceived firstand third-person effects. The study supported the hypothesized relationships between attitude
toward alcohol products and alcohol advertising, as well as the relationship between attitude
toward alcohol advertising and perceived first-person influence of alcohol advertising on oneself.
The results also supported the looking-glass perception hypothesis whereby the perceived
influence of alcohol advertising on oneself had a strong influence on the perceived influence on
others, which in turn led to greater support for restrictions on alcohol advertising.
This study attempted to model after Liu, Dong & Tang’s (2017) study by examining
attitudes toward politics and political talk shows as antecedents of the first- and third-person
effects of political shows in Taiwan. In the next section, we will present specific research
hypotheses derived from the literature reviewed above.
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Chapter Three
Research Hypotheses
To facilitate clarity, the following acronyms were used to represent the variables under
study.
ATTS: Attitude toward political talk shows.
ATTP: Attitude toward politics.
ATTR: Attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows.
SELF: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself.
OTHERS: Perceived influence of political talk shows on other people.
The first set of hypotheses deals with the relationships among the attitude variables (ATTS,
ATTP, and ATTR):
H1: There is a positive correlation between an attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and
attitude towards politics (ATTP). (ATTS ↔ ATTP)
H2: Attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) is a negative predictor of attitude toward
restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR). (ATTS à ATTR)
H3: Attitude toward politics (ATTP) is a negative predictor of attitude toward restrictions on
political talk shows (ATTR). (ATTP à ATTR)
The second group of hypotheses has to do with the first- and third-person effects:
H4: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) is a positive predictor of
attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR). (SELF à ATTR)
H5: Perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) is a positive predictor of
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attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR). (OTHERS à ATTR)
The third set of hypotheses brings together all five variables in the study: ATTS, ATTP,
SELF, OTHERS and ATTR.
H6: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) mediates the relationship
between attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and attitude toward restrictions on political
talk shows (ATTR). (ATTS à SELF à ATTR)
H7: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) mediates the relationship
between attitude toward politics (ATTP) and attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows
(ATTR). (ATTP à SELF à ATTR)
H8: Perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) mediates the relationship
between attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and attitude toward restrictions on political
talk shows (ATTR). (ATTS à OTHERS à ATTR)
H9: Perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) mediates the relationship
between attitude toward politics (ATTP) and attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows
(ATTR). (ATTP à OTHERS à ATTR)
The final hypothesis is derived from the hypothesis of looking-glass perception:
H10: Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) is a positive predictor of
perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS). (SELF → OTHERS)
The figure below shows the structural equation model that incorporates all above-stated
hypotheses.
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Figure 1. Structural Equation Model
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Chapter Four
Methodology
This section explains the research design and instruments that were used for data collection
in the study.

Design & Sample
An online survey was conducted to collect data for this study. The sample was selected
through convenient (snowball) sampling, a non-probability sampling technique which aims to
include all participants that are available at any given time (Babbie, 2001). Specifically,
approximately 1053 adult Taiwanese citizens were recruited through chain referral via social
media (e.g., Facebook and Twitter). Qualtrics, a leading web-based survey software application
was used for data gathering. The use of convenient sampling greatly reduces costs of survey
labor, time and materials, despite the limited external validity or generalizability of data
collected. Web-based survey tools allow for the instant transmission of results and eliminate the
need to manually input data for analysis (Evans & Mathur, 2005). Participation in the survey was
strictly voluntary and the identities of respondents remain confidential before and after the
survey. All information collected from respondents was protected and remain confidential
throughout the research process. The distributions of their gender, level of education, age, and
frequency of viewing political talk shows are shown in Tables 1 to 4, respectively.
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Table 1. Sample Gender

Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Missing

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Male

356

33.8

41.5

41.5

Female

502

47.7

58.5

100.0

Total

858

81.5

100.0

System

195

18.5

1053

100.0

Total

Table 2. Sample Level of Education
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Missing

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Did not complete high school

6

.6

.7

.7

Graduated from high school

49

4.7

5.7

6.4

Some college

166

15.8

19.4

25.8

Bachelor's degree

350

33.2

40.8

66.6

Master's degree

251

23.8

29.3

95.9

Ph.D.

32

3.0

3.7

99.6

Other

3

.3

.4

100.0

Total

857

81.4

100.0

System

196

18.6

1053

100.0

Total

Table 3. Sample Age
N

	
  

Minimum

What is your age?

839

Valid N (listwise)

839

Maximum

15

88
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Mean
36.85

Std. Deviation
14.858

Table 4. Sample Political Talk Shows Viewing Frequency

Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Missing

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Never

237

22.5

25.0

25.0

Sometimes

591

56.1

62.3

87.3

Very often

120

11.4

12.7

100.0

Total

948

90.0

100.0

System

105

10.0

1053

100.0

Total

Survey Instrument
The survey questionnaire contains 29 questions and takes about ten minutes to complete. An
informed consent and survey instructions are presented before the questions. The questionnaire
was first written in English and then translated into Chinese in order to facilitate responding.
Appendix B and C provide the English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire, respectively.
While completing the survey, respondents had the option to either choose not to answer specific
questions or withdraw altogether.

Measures
The key variables in this study were measured as follows.
Attitude toward Politics (ATTP). Measures of attitude toward politics include six Likert
scaled (5= strongly agree; 1= strongly disagree) items. Consistent with the definition of attitude
as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree
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of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken 1993), four items were designed to measure the
evaluative judgment of Taiwan’s democracy, politicians, political parties and government
respectively. Two items measured the experiential (interest) and instrumental (importance)
aspects of attitudes toward politics as prescribed by Holbert, Zeng, and Robinson (2017).
1. I am satisfied with the way democracy works in Taiwan.
2. I am satisfied with the performance of politicians in Taiwan.
3. I am satisfied with the performance of the major political parties in Taiwan.
4. I am happy with the performance of the Taiwanese government.
5. I am interested in knowing how politics works in Taiwan.
6. It is important to understand how politics works in Taiwan.
Attitude toward Television Political Talk Shows (ATTS). Measures of attitude toward
political shows were modified from the attitude-toward-the-news items used in PEW Research
Center (2004) and the American National Election Studies (2000) surveys. All six items were
measured by the Likert scale (5= strongly agree; 1= strongly disagree).
1. I enjoy watching political talk shows on television.
2. I feel that I can trust political talk shows to report the political news fairly.
3. Television political talk shows are often biased in its content.(reversed)
4. Political talk shows on television are often out of touch with people like me. (reversed)
5. I don’t always trust the views and opinions presented in television political talk shows.
(reversed)
6. Television political talk shows often depress me. (reversed)
Perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF). Adapted from Wu (2009)
and Liu, Dong & Tang (2017), the following four items were used to measure the perceived
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influence of political talk shows on oneself (i.e., first-person effect) on a 4-point scale (4: a great
deal of influence, 3: some influence, 2: not much influence, 1: no influence at all).
1. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences your own political
views?
2. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences your own opinions
about politicians?
3. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences your own views about
the government?
4. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences your own outlook for
Taiwan?
Perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS). By changing the
wording from “your own” to “other people’s,” the following items were used to measure
perceived influence of political talk shows on others (i.e., the third-person effect) on a 4-point
scale (4: a great deal of influence, 3: some influence 2: not much influence, 1: no influence at
all).
1. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences other people’s political
views?
2. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences other people’s
opinions about politicians?
3. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences other people’s views
about the government?
4. To what extent watching television political talk shows influences other people’s outlook
for Taiwan.
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Attitude toward Restrictions on Television Political Talk Shows (ATTR). Three items
adapted from Lo and Wei (2002) and Wu (2009) were used to measure attitude toward
restrictions on political talk shows on the Likert Scale (5= strongly agree; 1= strongly disagree).
1. I support a boycott of television political talk shows.
2. I support public petitions against television political talk shows.
3. I support more government restrictions on television political talk shows.
In addition to the measures of the key variables above, measures of political ideology,
political party affiliation, and demographics were also included in the questionnaire.
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Chapter Five
Results
Table 5 displays the means, standards deviations and reliability measures (Cronbach’s
alphas) of ATTP, ATTS, SELF, OTHERS, ATTR. All Cronbach’s alphas were greater than .70,
indicating the measures achieved acceptable levels of internal consistency.

Table 5. Descriptive and Reliability Statistics
N of Items

Scale Mean

Std. Deviation

Cronbach’s Alpha

ATTP

6

2.71

.56

.708

ATTS

6

2.26

.53

.704

SELF

4

2.21

.65

.849

OTHERS

4

2.93

.67

.887

ATTR

3

2.84

.91

.825

Table 6 shows the results of a paired samples t-test that compared respondents’ perceived
influence of political talk shows on themselves and on other people. Test results indicated that
respondents tended to perceive greater influence of political talk shows on others (Mean
OTHERS = 2.93, SD = .67) than on themselves (Mean SELF = 2.21, SD = .65) (t = - 25.285, df
= 644, p < 0.001).

Table 6. Paired Samples t-test: Self vs. Others
95% Confidence Interval
Mean

	
  

Pair

SELF -

1

OTHERS

-.72403

Std.

Std. Error

Deviation

Mean

.72727

of the Difference
Lower

.02864
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-.78026

Upper

t

-.66780 -25.284

df
644

Sig.
.000

One-sample t-test result (Table 7) showed that all three attitude means were significantly
lower than the neutral point of 3 on the scale (tATTP = -12.84, df = 644, p < 0.001; tATTS = -35.55,
df = 644, p < 0.001, tATTR = -4.50, df = 644, p < 0.001 ), indicating that respondents held
somewhat negative attitudes toward politics, political talk shows and restrictions on political
talks shows.

Table 7. One Sample t-tests: ATTP, ATTS, ATTR
95% Confidence Interval of the
Difference
t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Lower

Upper

ATTP

-12.839

644

.000

-.28630

-.3301

-.2425

ATTS

-35.545

644

.000

-.74186

-.7828

-.7009

ATTR

-4.500

644

.000

-.16072

-.2309

-.0906

Measurement Model Results
Table 8 shows the standardized regression weight estimates and their standard errors for
construct indicators. The regression weights for all the indicators are statistically significant
(P<.001). Additionally, the standard errors are small, indicating acceptable validity of the
measurement model.

Table 8. Measurement Model Results

ATTS1
ATTS2

	
  

← ATTS
← ATTS

Standardized
regression
weight
.403
.623

S.E.

C.R.

P

.161

8.356

***
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Table 8. Measurement Model Results (Continued)

ATTS3
ATTS4
ATTS5
ATTS6
ATTP1
ATTP2
ATTP3
ATTP4
ATTP5
ATTP6
Self1
Self2
Self3
Self4
Other1
Other3
Other2
Other4
ATTR2
ATTR1
ATTR3

Standardized
regression
weight
.617

S.E.

C.R.

P

.138

8.330

***

← ATTS
← ATTS
← ATTS
← ATTP
← ATTP
← ATTP
← ATTP
← ATTP
← ATTP
← SELF
← SELF
← SELF
← SELF
← OTHERS

.568

.173

8.078

***

.492

.127

7.588

***

.544

.159

7.937

***

.785

.150

9.784

***

.848

.165

9.946

***

.817

.178

9.876

***

.112

.093

2.594

.009

.066

.089

1.540

.123

.778

.061

18.440

***

.834

.063

19.456

***

.714

.067

16.994

***

← OTHERS
← OTHERS

.858

.048

23.218

***

.838

.047

22.649

***

← OTHERS
← ATTR

.785

.051

.912

.041

24.345

***

← ATTR
← ATTR

.877
.049

16.558

***

← ATTS

.404

.738

.787

.609

*** p<.001
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20.987

***

Structure Model Results
Table 9 shows the results of the structural model obtained through SPSS AMOS. An initial
question is whether the structural equation analysis estimates for the model provide an adequate
fit to the data. Although the Chi-square test indicates a lack of model fit (𝑋 ! =424.05, df = 220, p
= .000), it should be noted that the Chi-square test is sensitive to large sample sizes like the one
employed in the present study. Assessment of the model’s fit thus relied on other goodness-of-fit
indices. Byrne (2001) suggests that models with NFI, RFI, IFI, and CFI values greater than .90,
and a RMSEA less than or equal to .10 be judged as providing a reasonable fit to the data.
Similarly, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend RMSEA values below .06. In this study, all these
goodness-of-fit indices (NFI = .934, RFI = .914, IFI = .963, TLI = .952, CFI = .963, RMSEA
= .043) indicate that the model provides acceptable fit to the data. Figure 2 is a pictorial display
of the structural model results.

Table 9. Structure Model Results
Standardized
regression
weight
SELF
.207
← ATTS
SELF
OTHERS
OTHERS
OTHERS
ATTR
ATTR
ATTR
ATTR
ATTS

←
←
←
←
←
←
←
←
↔

S.E.

C.R.

.097

3.037

.002

ATTP

-.078

.077

-1.301

.193

ATTS

-.247

.101

-3.859

***

ATTP

-.064

.076

-1.194

.233

SELF

.488

.053

10.244

***

ATTS

-.460

.185

-5.871

***

ATTP

-.101

.116

-1.829

.067

SELF

-.018

.084

-.355

.722

OTHERS

-.065

.075

-1.285

.199

ATTP

.551

.015

5.907

***

*** p<.001
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Chi-square = 424.05, df = 220, p = .000
NFI = .934, RFI = .914, IFI = .963, TLI = .952, CFI = .963, RMSEA = .043
** p<.01, * p<.05
Figure 2. Structural Model Results (Whole Sample)
Hypotheses Testing
This section presents hypotheses testing results, starting with the first group of hypotheses
which deal with the relationships among the attitude variables (ATTS, ATTP, and ATTR). H1
states that there is a positive correlation between an attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS)
and attitude toward politics (ATTP). The hypothesis was supported by the positive correlation
between ATTS and ATTP (r!""#←→!""# = .551, p< .001): As Taiwanese citizens’ attitude toward
political talk shows becomes more favorable, so does their attitude toward politics, and vice
versa.
H2, which states that attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) is a negative predictor of
attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR), was supported (β!""#→!""# = .460,
p< .001). However, results failed to support H3 that states attitude toward politics (ATTP) is a
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negative predictor of attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR) (β!""#→!""# =
-.101, p= .067).
The second group of hypotheses is related to the behavioral aspects of the first- and
third-person effects (SELF à ATTR and OTHERS à ATTR). H4, which states that perceived
influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) is a positive predictor of attitude toward
restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR), was not supported (β!"#$→!""# = -.018, p= .772).
Similarly, results failed to support H5 which states that perceived influence of political talk
shows on others (OTHERS) is a positive predictor of attitude toward restrictions on political talk
shows (ATTR) (β!"#$%&→!""# = -.065, p= .199).
The third set of hypotheses, H6 to H9, brings together all five variables in the research:
ATTS, ATTP, SELF, OTHERS and ATTR. The hypotheses tested whether the perceived
influence on oneself and others would mediate the effects of attitudes toward political talk shows
and politics on attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows.
H6 states that perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) mediates the
relationship between attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and attitude toward restrictions
on political talk shows (ATTR). To support the mediating hypothesis, both paths of ATTS to
SELF and SELF to ATTR must attain statistical significance. Results showed that the path of
ATTS to SELF was significant (β ATTS→SELF = .31, p < .01), but the path of SELF to ATTR was
not (β SELF→ATTR = .07, p = .72). H6 was therefore not supported.
H7 predicts that perceived influence of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) mediates the
relationship between attitude toward politics (ATTP) and attitude toward restrictions on political
talk shows (ATTR). The hypothesis was not supported because neither the ATTP à SELF nor
the SELF à ATTR path was statistically significant (β ATTP→SELF = -.08, p = .19; β SELF→ATTR =
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-.02, p = .72).
H8 prescribes that perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) mediates
the relationship between attitude toward political talk shows (ATTS) and attitude toward
restrictions on political talk shows (ATTR). The mediating hypothesis would be supported by
significant paths of ATTS to OTHERS and OTHERS to ATTR. Results showed that the path of
ATTS to OTHERS did reach significance (β ATTS→OTHERS = -.25, p < .01) but the path of SELF to
ATTR did not (β OTHERS→ATTR = -.07, p = .23). H8 was therefore not supported.
H9 predicts that perceived influence of political talk shows on others (OTHERS) mediates
the relationship between attitude toward politics (ATTP) and attitude toward restrictions on
political talk shows (ATTR). The hypothesis was not supported because neither the ATTP à
OTHERS nor the OTHERS à ATTR path was statistically significant (β ATTP→OTHERS = -.06, p
= .23; β OTHERS→ATTR = -.07, p = .20).
The final hypothesis tested the looking-glass perception. H10 states that perceived influence
of political talk shows on oneself (SELF) is a positive predictor of perceived influence of
political talk shows on others (OTHERS). The hypothesis was clearly supported by the
significant path between SELF and OTHERS (β  !"#$→!"#$%& = .488, p< .001), suggesting that
respondents transferred their perceived influence of political talk shows on themselves onto
others.
The hypothesis testing results presented above were based on the entire sample of the study.
Further analysis was performed on respondents whose political ideology was neutral and
non-neutral (Pan-Green or Pan-Blue), respectively. Results from the group analyses were nearly
identical to those obtained from the whole sample (see Figure 3 and 4). Political ideology was
therefore not a conditional factor in the present study.
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Figure 3. Structural Model Results (Ideology Neutral Group)
** p<.01, * p<.05

Figure 4. Structural Model Results (Pan-Green & Pan-Blue Group)
** p<.01, * p<.05
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Chapter Six
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore the relationships among Taiwanese audiences’
attitudes toward political talk shows and politics, their perceived influence of political talk shows
on themselves and others, and their attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows. A series
of hypotheses were proposed and tested, and the results are summarized in Table 10.

Table 10. Summary of Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis

	
  

Relationship

Rationale

Result

H1

ATTS←→ATTP

Correlation

Supported

H2

ATTS→ATTR

Direct effect

Supported

H3

ATTP→ATTR

Direct effect

Not supported

H4

SELF→ATTR

Direct effect

Not supported

H5

OTHERS→ATTR

Direct effect

Not supported

H6

ATTS→SELF→ATTR

Indirect (mediated) effect

Not supported

H7

ATTP→SELF→ATTR

Indirect (mediated) effect

Not supported

H8

ATTS→OTHERS→ATTR

Indirect (mediated) effect

Not supported

H9

ATTP→OTHERS→ATTR

Indirect (mediated) effect

Not supported

H10

SELF→OTHERS

Looking glass perception

Supported
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The popularity of political talk shows in Taiwan is clearly reflected in the present study in
that the majority of respondents (75%) watched political talk shows. Most of them (62.3%)
watched political talk shows sometimes and some (12.7%) watched political talk shows very
often. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that respondents expressed slightly negative attitudes
toward both political talk shows and politics. Although these attitudes are significantly correlated
(r = .551), neither of them was found to be related to respondents’ attitude toward restrictions on
political talk shows.
Another interesting finding was that, despite the positive correlation between attitude
toward political talk shows and politics, only attitude toward political talk shows was related to
first- and third-person effects. The results suggest that a distinction was made in the minds of the
respondents between politics and television shows about politics. Regardless of one’s attitude
toward politics, the perceived influence of political shows on one’s own or others’ political
views could only be ascribed to one’s attitude toward the shows.
Results of the study further indicated that respondents’ attitude toward political talk shows
had opposite relationships with first- and third-person effects: the more (less) favorable
respondents’ attitude toward political shows, the stronger (weaker) the perceived influence of the
shows on themselves (β!""#→!"#$   = .207); and conversely, the more (less) favorable respondents’
attitude toward the political shows was, the weaker (stronger) the perceived influence of the
shows on other people (β!""#→!"#$%&   = -.247). The positive relationship between attitude
toward political talk shows and perceived first-person effect is consistent with prior research
which generally showed that as the desirability of a message increased, so did the perceived
influence of the message on oneself (Eveland & McLeod, 1999; Gunther & Thorson, 1992). In
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this study, respondents who enjoyed watching political talk shows might thus perceive the shows
to have a beneficial influence on their own political views. Likewise, the negative relationship
between attitude toward political shows and perceived third-person effect is in agreement with
prior research that demonstrated that as the undesirability of a message increased, so did the
perceived influence of the message on others (Eveland & McLeod, 1999; McLeod et al., 1999).
The more negatively respondents felt about political talk shows, the more likely they would
expect the shows to have harmful effects on other people’s political views. As reported earlier,
respondents tended to perceive greater influence of political talk shows on others than on
themselves, it seems reasonable to surmise that, as the attitude toward political talk shows
become more extreme, the gap between the perceived influence of the shows on self and others
would become wider. Collectively, these results provide strong support for the assumption that
attitude toward political talk shows serves as the precursor to both first- and third-person effects.
Perhaps the most intriguing finding of the present study is the absence of the mediating
process. That is, although respondents’ attitude toward political show was related to the
perceived influence of political talk shows on themselves and others, the perceived influence was
not related to their attitude toward restrictions on political talk shows. Essentially the respondents
were saying, “we may not like political talk shows and our political views may be affected by
these shows, but do not restrict the shows for our or others’ sake.” The results thus directly
contradict the generally presumed behavioral consequences of the first-person effect (that people
would favor restricting messages that may negatively affect themselves) or the third-person
effect (that people would support restricting messages to protect others from harmful effects)
(e.g., McLeod, 1999; McLeod et al., 2001; Salwen and Dupagne,1999). One possible explanation
for the lack of support for restrictions observed in this study is the deep appreciation and respect
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for free speech among the Taiwanese -- despite the endless conflicts between different political
factions and the controversial role the media have played in Taiwan’s democratization process.
Even if Taiwanese people do not like the content of political talk shows or disagree with their
views and positions, they would still consider the shows to be covered under freedom of speech
and expression, thus worthy of constitutional protection.
Finally, the positive path leading first-person to third-person effect lent strong support for
the presence of looking-glass perception through which respondents projected their perceived
influence on themselves to that on others -- if political talk show has an impact on me, it must
also have an impact on others. However, the looking-glass perception should not be confused
with the false consensus effect -- the cognitive bias that leads people to believe that their own
opinions are the norms and that the majority of people share the same opinions (Ross, Greene, &
House, 1977). As noted above, while the perceived first-person effect of political talk shows was
positive, the perceived third-person effect of political shows was negative. In other words, the
looking-glass perception observed in this study was neither false nor a consensus.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusions
This thesis represents perhaps the first empirical study of the first-person and third-person
effects of political talk shows as well as their attitudinal antecedents and consequences in Taiwan.
The general results showed that political talk shows had significant but opposite perceived
influence on self and others. Unlike previous studies that often stressed the importance of either
the first- or the third-person effect, this study demonstrated the coexistence of both effects in the
context of political communications. Contrary to prior studies that apprised such behavioral
consequences of third-person effect as speech restrictions or censorship, this study found no such
evidence. Results of the present study suggest that media audience are willing and able to
counter the perceived influence of political communications on themselves and others in order to
uphold the constitutionally protected freedom of political speech and expression.
This research also extended previous studies by showing the intricate relationship between
the first- and the third-person effect. By projecting one’s own views to others through looking
glass perception, the first-person effect may actually give more impetus to the third-person effect
in evaluating the effects of political communications. While the tendency to project one’s own
views onto others may not be unique to the Taiwanese, the Taiwanese seem to have a keen sense
of the importance of knowing what their fellow citizens think and feel when living together in a
young and still fragile democracy. In that sense, the looking glass perception serves as a
psychological conduit between first- and third-person effects.
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Like other empirical studies, this study has several limitations. First, the study results are
limited in terms of their generalizability because data were gathered from a convenience sample
of respondents who resided mostly in the northern part of Taiwan. Future research based on more
representative populations is therefore needed. Second, the survey data and structural equation
modeling (SEM) analysis used in this study dealt with correlation, not causation (Everitt & Dunn,
1991). It is also likely that this study merely illuminated one of several theoretically viable
models of the relationships among the variables. Future research should thus attempt to the test
different models to better determine the validity of alternative theoretical explanations and
predictions.
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Appendix A
Taiwan Profile: Timeline
Source: BBC News (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16178545)
1683 - China's Qing Dynasty formally annexes Taiwan, which had hitherto been divided
between aboriginal kingdoms and Chinese and European settlers, most prominently the Dutch.
1895 - China cedes Taiwan among other territories to Japan after losing the First Sino-Japanese
War.
1915 - Tapani Incident prompts Japan to reform its administration of the settled population,
which turns to civic and political activity. Japanese treatment of aboriginal population remains
harsh.
1930 - Troops crush last major aboriginal uprising, the Wushe Rebellion.
1942 - Chinese Kuomintang government renounces all treaties with Japan and demands the
return of Taiwan as part of any post-war settlement, which is endorsed by the Allies in the Cairo
Declaration the following year.
1945 - US places Taiwan under Chinese administrative control after Japan surrenders.
1947 - Discontent with centralised rule by Kuomintang mainlanders boils over in 228 Incident.
Chinese authorities imposes martial law, kill large numbers of protesters demanding free
elections and clean government, and ban thousands of others from political activity.
1949 - Communist victory in Chinese Civil War leads to evacuation of Kuomintang government
to Taiwan, along with about two million refugees. Mainlanders dominate island until the end of
martial law in 1987.
Taiwan-based Republic of China government retains UN and Western recognition as legitimate
government of all China until the 1970s.
1950s-1960s - Rapid industrial development stimulated by export-oriented policy and US
economic aid, while Kuomintang justifies one-party rule on the grounds of opposing any
Communist threat.
1971 - UN recognises Communist China as sole government of whole country after veteran
Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek refuses dual-representation deal. People's Republic takes
over China's UN Security Council seat.
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1975 - Chiang Kai-shek dies. His son Chiang Ching-kuo begins cautious policy of liberalisation,
including the promotion of more native Taiwanese to positions of authority.
1977 - First opposition breakthrough at parliamentary elections by the Tangwai (Outside the
Party) group.
1979 - Kaohsiung Incident, in which police kill pro-democracy protesters and arrest all available
opposition leaders. International attention drawn to the Kuomintang's repressive rule.
1980 - Opposition leaders sentenced to long prison sentences over the Kaohsiung Incident.
1986 - Authorities do not prevent Democratic Progressive Party from organising, despite
nominal ban on opposition parties. Candidates stand in elections under Tangwai banner.
1987 - Chiang Ching-kuo abolishes martial law, allows family visits to mainland.
1988 - Chiang dies. His chosen successor, Taiwan-born Lee Teng-hui, launches 'Taiwanisation'
policy to dismantle many structures left over from 1949 and relaxes restrictions on native
language and culture.
1996 - Free elections, in which Lee beats Democratic Progressive Party's Peng Min-ming.
Communist China tries to disrupt elections with missile tests, urtailed by US dispatch of aircraft
carriers to the region.
2000 March - Chen Shui-bian wins presidential elections, ending the Kuomintang party's 50-year
monopoly of power.
2000 May - Chen Shui-bian says in his inaugural speech that he will not declare independence as
long as China does not attack. He says he won't call for a referendum on independence, nor
abolish Taipei's official blueprint for an eventual reunion with mainland China.
China responds by accusing him of insincerity, and by saying he had evaded the key question of
whether he considered Taiwan part of China.
2000 August - President Chen Shui-bian stops over briefly in the United States before starting a
two-week tour of Central America and Africa. He gets no official welcome.
2000 October - Government halts work on the construction of a nuclear power plant, sparking a
major political row. It argues that the facility - approved and started under the previous
government - would not be a safe source of energy.
2000 October - Chang Chun-hsiung sworn in as prime minister. He replaces Tang Fei, from the
main opposition Nationalist Party, who stepped down amid disputes with President Chen, over
issues including the scrapping of the nuclear plant.
2001 April - The exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, meets President Chen during a
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visit which draws strong opposition from China.
2001 April - US says it will go ahead with sales of submarines, warships and anti-submarine
aircraft, but not the requested naval combat radar system Aegis. China protests and President
George W Bush pledges to help Taiwan should China invade.
2001 June - Taiwan test-fires Patriot anti-missile defence system bought from US, as China
carries out military exercises simulating invasion of island.
2001 November - Taipei lifts a 50-year ban on direct trade and investment with China.
2001 December - Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party loses its parliamentary majority for the
first time.
2002 January - Taiwan officially enters the World Trade Organisation, only a few weeks after
China.
2003 May - Dramatic rise in cases of the pneumonia-like Sars virus.
2003 July - Taiwan is the final country to be removed from the WHO's list of countries which
were badly affected by the Sars virus.
2003 November - Taiwan unveils the 508-metre Taipei 101 building, which it says is the world's
tallest.
2003 November - Parliament approves bill to allow referendum on declaring independence
should China attack. Referendums on sovereignty and changing country's name are not
sanctioned.
2004 March - President Chen Shui-bian wins a second term by a slender margin. His win follows
an apparent assassination attempt against him on the eve of elections.
2004 November - Court rejects opposition challenge that President Chen Shui-bian won March's
presidential election unfairly.
2005 January - Aircraft chartered for the Lunar New Year holiday make the first direct flights
between Taiwan and China since 1949.
2005 March - Taiwan condemns a new Chinese law giving Beijing the legal right to use force
should Taipei declare formal independence.
2005 April - National Party (KMT) leader Lien Chan visits China for the first meeting between
Nationalist and Communist Party leaders since 1949.
2005 June - Reform requiring future constitutional amendments to be put to a referendum
arouses China's concern that it will be easier for activists to promote moves towards
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independence.
2005 July - National Party (KMT) elects mayor of Taipei Ma Ying Jeou as its new leader.
2005 December - Opposition KMT triumphs in municipal elections. The result is interpreted as a
mid-term vote of no confidence in President Chen Shui-bian.
2006 February - Taiwan scraps the National Unification Council, a body set up to deal with
reunification with the mainland. China says the decision could bring "disaster".
2006 June - Under pressure over corruption allegations against a family member, President Chen
cedes some of his powers to the prime minister.
2006 October - President Chen survives an attempt by parliament to force a referendum on his
rule - the second in four months. His opponents and supporters take to the streets.
2006 December - An earthquake off Taiwan cuts undersea cables, cutting off or limiting
telecommunications across the region.
2007 January - Taiwan defends school history textbooks which refer to China. Beijing accuses
Taipei of introducing independence ideologies into the classroom.
2007 March - Newspaper reports that Taiwan has test-fired cruise missile capable of hitting
Shanghai or Hong Kong.
2007 March - Taiwanese government begins removing statue of Chiang Kai-shek from
Kaohsiung, sparking protests.
2007 April - China and Taiwan clash over route of Olympic torch relay ahead of 2008 Beijing
games.
2007 August - The country attempts to join the UN for the first time under the name Taiwan,
rather than the official title of Republic of China. The application is rejected.
2008 January - Opposition KMT wins landslide victory in parliamentary elections, beating
President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Mr Chen steps down from post
of DPP chairman.
2008 March - Presidential elections. Ma Ying-jeou of the opposition Kuomintang Party is elected
president.
2008 June - First formal talks with China since dialogue was suspended in 1999.
2008 July - President Ma apologises for the killing and imprisonment of tens of thousands of
political dissidents in the 1950s and 60s - a period known as the white terror. The violence took
place when martial law was imposed by the Kuomintang party after its leaders fled to the island
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in 1949 at the end of the Chinese civil war.
2008 November - The highest ranking Chinese official to visit Taiwan in more than half a
century holds talks in Taipei on improving relations. The visit of Chen Yunlin, China's top
negotiator on Taiwan, was met with protests by pro-independence supporters.
Former President Chen Shui-bian arrested and charged with money laundering, bribery and
embezzlement of government funds. Mr Chen said the allegations were politically motivated.
2008 December - Gift of two giant pandas by China seen as a further improvement in relations.
2009 March - Former President Chen Shui-bian goes on trial on charges including taking bribes,
money laundering and extortion.
2009 April - China drops longstanding objections to Taiwan's participation in World Health
Organisation. Taiwan says it will lift ban on investment from China.
2009 May - Chinese President Hu Jintao and the chairman of the governing Kuomintang (KMT)
party, Wu Po-hsiung, agree to talks on a wide-ranging trade pact.
2009 July - The leaders of China and Taiwan exchange direct messages for the first time in more
than 60 years, in a sign of warming ties.
2009 August - Typhoon Morakot hits southern Taiwan, leaving hundreds dead in floods and
mudslides. In September, premier Liu Chao-shiuan resigns amid criticism of the government's
response.
2010 January - US approves the sale of air defence missiles to Taiwan under a proposed $6.7bn
arms package. China suspends military contacts with the US, imposes sanctions on US firms
involved.
2010 June - Taiwan and China sign landmark free trade pact seen as most significant agreement
in 60 years of separation.
2011 February - A senior army officer is detained on suspicion of spying for China.
2011 March - Five convicted murderers are executed, the second use of the death penalty in the
past year.
2012 January - President Ma Ying-jeou wins a second term in office.
2012 July - Taiwan's economy contracts in three months to end of June, as the global slowdown
weighed on export-dependent countries. Economy contracted 0.16% compared with the previous
year.
2012 August - China and Taiwan sign investment protection deal that sets up formal channels to
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settle disputes. It details rights of Taiwanese investors if detained by Chinese authorities and vice
versa. China is Taiwan's biggest trading partner, with bilateral trade worth $110bn (£70bn) a
year.
2013 January - Japan turns back a small Taiwanese boat from East China Sea islands claimed by
China and Taiwan. The row has left ties between Tokyo and Beijing severely strained. Four
Taiwanese coastguard vessels escorted the boat. The islands are called Senkaku in Japan,
Diaoyutai in Taiwan and Diaoyu in China.
2013 April - Taiwan holds its first live fire drills in five years, after President Ma Ying-jeou
warns about China's rising military investment.
2013 May - Major diplomatic row erupts between Taiwan and Philippines after Filipino
coastguards kill a Taiwanese fisherman in disputed waters.
2013 June - Taiwan and China sign cross-Strait services trade agreement, which allows the two
sides to invest much more freely in one another's services market.
2013 October - Services trade agreement signed with China in June is stalled in Taiwan's
parliament by opposition MPs, amid concerns that it will hurt industry and small businesses.
2014 February - China and Taiwan hold their first government-to-government talks since the
Communists came to power in 1949. The Taiwanese government minister in charge of the
island's China policy meets his mainland counterpart in the eastern city of Nanjing.
2014 March - Opposition supporters occupy parliament to protest at cross-Strait services trade
agreement, which they say would allow the mainland excessive influence over the Taiwanese
economy by freeing up direct investment rules. Parliament has not yet ratified it.
2014 April - The head of the US Environmental Protection Agency visits Taiwan, the first visit
by a cabinet-level US official for 14 years.
2014 June - The most senior Chinese official overseeing ties with Taiwan visits the island, amid
controversy over a proposed trade pact.
2014 August - Dozens are killed and hundreds injured after a gas leak causes huge explosions in
Taiwan's second largest city, Kaohsiung.
2014 October - Taiwan bans its senior government officials from higher studies in mainland
China, citing national security reasons.
2014 December - President Ma Ying-jeou resigns as chairman of the ruling Kuomintang party
after its crushing defeat in local elections. The polls were seen as a referendum on Mr Ma's
pro-China policies.
2015 January - Former President Chen Shui-bian is released from prison on medical parole after
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after serving six years of a 20-year sentence for corruption.
2015 January - Mayor of New Taipei Eric Chu is elected chairman of the ruling Kuomintang
(KMT) party.
2015 February - Prosecutors charge 118 people with offences related to the occupation of the
island's parliament and government offices in 2014, dubbed the "Sunflower Movement", in
protest over a proposed trade pact with China.
2015 March - China postpones the launch of four new flight routes near Taiwan after a fierce
backlash from the island's authorities over the plan.
2015 October - The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party drops Hung Hsiu-chu as its presidential
candidate following a series of poor opinion poll ratings. She had been the party's first female
candidate for the post.
2015 November - Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou and China's President Xi Jinping hold
historic talks in Singapore, the first such meeting since the Chinese Civil War finished and the
nations split in 1949.
2016 January - Pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-wen wins
presidential election, takes office in May.
2017 June - Panama switches diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, in a major coup for
the latter. Sao Tome and Principe did the same in December 2016, leaving Taiwan to enjoy full
diplomatic relations with only 20 other countries.
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Appendix B
Survey Questionnaire (English)
[INFORMED CONSENT]
Thank you for participating in this survey. Although you are not required to answer
any question that you consider personal, we would like you to answer as many
questions as possible. Please select or mark your answers clearly.

1. How often do you watch political talk shows on television?
[1] never

[2] sometimes

[3] very often

(if never, skip to Question 25)

We’d like to know how you feel about some statements about politics in Taiwan. Please
tell us the extent that you agree or disagree with each of the statements below.
2. I like the way democracy works in Taiwan.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

3. I am satisfied with the performance of politicians in Taiwan.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

4. I am satisfied with the performance of the major political parties in Taiwan.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

5. I am happy with the performance of the Taiwanese government.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

6. I am interested in knowing how politics works in Taiwan.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

7. It is important to understand how politics works in Taiwan.
[1] strongly disagree

	
  

[2] disagree
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[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

The following statements relate to television political talk shows. Please tell us the
extent that you agree or disagree with each statement.

8. I enjoy watching political talk shows on television.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

9. I feel that I can trust political talk shows to report the political news fairly.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

10. Television political talk shows are often biased in its content.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

11. Political talk shows on television are often out of touch with people like me.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

12. I don’t always trust the views and opinions presented in television political talk shows.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

13. Television political talk shows often depress me.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

Please tell us the extent to which watching political talk shows has an influence on your
own thoughts and behavior.
14. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence your own political views?
[1] no influence at all

[2] very little influence

[3] some influence

[4] a great deal of influence

15. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence your own opinions about
politicians?
[1] no influence at all

[2] very little influence

[3] some influence

[4] a great deal of influence

16. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence your own views about the
government?
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[1] no influence at all

[2] very little influence

[3] some influence

[4] a great deal of influence

17. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence your own outlook for
Taiwan?
[1] no influence at all

[2] very little influence

[3] some influence

[4] a great deal of influence

Please tell us the extent to which watching political talk shows has an influence on other
people’s thoughts and behavior.
18. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence other people’s political
views?
[1] no influence at all

[2] very little influence

[3] some influence

[4] a great deal of influence

19. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence other people’s opinions
about politicians?
[1] no influence at all

[2] very little influence

[3] some influence

[4] a great deal of influence

20. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence other people’s views about
the government?
[1] no influence at all

[2] very little influence

[3] some influence

[4] a great deal of influence

21. To what extent watching television political talk shows influence other people’s outlook for
Taiwan?
[1] no influence at all

[2] very little influence

[3] some influence

[4] a great deal of influence

Some people have suggested that there ought to be some forms of restrictions on television
political shows. Please tell us the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
restrictions.
22. There should be a boycott of television political talk shows.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

23. People in Taiwan should petition against television political talk shows.
[1] strongly disagree
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[3] neutral
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[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

24. The government should impose restrictions on television political talk shows.
[1] strongly disagree

[2] disagree

[3] neutral

[4] agree

[5] strongly agree

Finally, a few background questions about you.
25. Generally speaking, your political ideology is:
[1] pan-green

[2] pan-blue

[3] neutral

26. Are you a member of the following political parties?
[1] Kuomintang

[2] Democratic Progressive Party

[5] New Power Party

[3] People First Party

[4] New Party

[6] None of the above

27. What is your level of education?
[1] did not complete high school
degree

[5] master’s degree

[2] graduated from high school
[6] Ph.D.

[3] some college

[7] other: _______________

28. What is your age? _______________ years old
29. Your gender is:

[1] male

[2] female

This concludes the survey. Thank you!
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[4] bachelor’s

Appendix C
Survey Questionnaire (Chinese)
政論節目的態度調查

[研究參與知情同意書]

感謝您參與此次研究調查。雖然您不需要回答任何您認為關於私人的問題，但我們
希望您能盡可能地回答本調查的問題。請清楚地選擇或標記您的答案，謝謝。

1. 您平常多久看一次電視政論節目？
[1] 從不看 [2] 偶爾看 [3] 時常看 (如 果 從 不 看 ， 跳 至 25 題 )

我們想知道您對台灣政治的感受，請告訴我們對以下的論述您同意的程度。

2. 我喜歡民主制度在台灣的運作。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

3. 我對台灣政治人物的表現感到滿意。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

4. 我對台灣主要政黨的表現感到滿意。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

5. 我對台灣政府的表現感到滿意。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

6. 我有興趣了解台灣的政治運作。
[1] 非常不同意

	
  

[2] 不同意
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7. 對我而言，了解政治在台灣如何運作是很重要的。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

以下的問題與電視政論節目有關，請告訴我們您對於各項陳述同意的程度。
8. 我喜歡看電視政論節目。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

9. 我相信政論節目可以公正地報導政治新聞。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

10. 電視政論節目的內容往往有偏見。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

11. 電視上的政論節目經常與我的現實生活脫節。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

12. 我並不總是相信電視政論節目中提出的意見和看法。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

13. 電視政論節目經常讓我感到沮喪。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

請告訴我們，觀看政論節目對您自己的想法和行為有什麼程度的影響。
14. 就政治觀點而言，電視政論節目對您本身影響的程度是：
[1] 完全沒影響

[2] 很小的影響

[3] 有一些影響

[4] 有很大影響

15. 就政治人物的看法而言，電視政論節目對您本身影響的程度是：
[1] 完全沒影響

[2] 很小的影響

[3] 有一些影響

[4] 有很大影響

16. 就政府的看法而言，電視政論節目對您本身影響的程度是：
[1] 完全沒影響

[2] 很小的影響

[3] 有一些影響

[4] 有很大影響

17. 就台灣的前景而言，電視政論節目對您本身的影響程度是：
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[1] 完全沒影響

[2] 很小的影響

[3] 有一些影響

[4] 有很大影響

請告訴我們，觀看政論節目對其他人的想法和行為有什麼程度的影響。
18. 就政治觀點而言，電視政論節目對其他人的影響程度是：
[1] 完全沒影響

[2] 很小的影響

[3] 有一些影響

[4] 有很大影響

19. 就政治人物的看法而言，電視政論節目對其他人的影響程度是：
[1] 完全沒影響

[2] 很小的影響

[3] 有一些影響

[4] 有很大影響

20. 就政府的看法而言，電視政論節目對其他人的影響程度是：
[1] 完全沒影響

[2] 很小的影響

[3] 有一些影響

[4] 有很大影響

21. 就台灣的前景而言，電視政論節目對其他人的影響程度是：
[1] 完全沒影響

[2] 很小的影響

[3] 有一些影響

[4] 有很大影響

有人建議對電視政論節目應該採取某些限制。請告訴我們您同意或不同意以下的限
制。
22. 應該抵制政論節目。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

[3] 中立

[4] 同意

[5] 非常同意

23. 台灣民眾應當請願反對政論節目。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

24. 政府應該對政論節目施加限制。
[1] 非常不同意

[2] 不同意

最後，還有幾個關於您的問題。
25. 一般來說，您的政治意識型態是：
[1] 親藍

[2] 親綠

[3] 中立

26. 你是以下政黨的成員嗎？
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[1] 國民黨

[2] 民進黨

[3] 親民黨

[4] 新黨

[5] 時代力量

[6] 無黨籍

27. 您的教育程度：
[1] 高中職以下
[2] 高中職
他：_______________

28. 您的年齡：

29. 您的性別：

[3] 大專

[4] 學士

_______________

[1] 男

[2] 女

調查結束。謝謝！
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[5] 碩士

[6] 博士

[7] 其

2/28/2018
Shou-Chen Hsieh
School of Advertising and Mass Communications
4202 E Fowler Ave.
Tampa, FL 33620
RE: Exempt Certification
IRB#: Pro00032601
Title: Political Talk Shows in Taiwan: First- and Third-Person Effects and Their Attitudinal
Antecedents
Dear S. Hsieh:
On 2/28/2018, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria
for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b):
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement),
survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless:
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified,
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human
subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or
civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in
the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.
Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is
closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously
declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation
of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not
warrant an amendment or new application.
Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not
limit your ability to conduct your research project.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have
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